UMG’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Global Eagle’s Response
Judge Wu’s Tentative Order
Judge Wu’s Supplemental Order
UMG’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Global Eagle’s Response
Judge Wu’s Tentative Order
Judge Wu’s Supplemental Order
The Second Circuit delivered its highly anticipated decision in the Capitol Records v. Vimeo case. Various record labels sued UGC site Vimeo for copyright infringement of sound recording fixed prior to February 14, 1972, so-called Pre-72 recordings. The labels argued that the safe harbor provisions of Sec. 512 of the Copyright Act, which provides immunity to copyright infringement liability to UGC host sites subject to certain conditions, do not apply to Pre 72 recordings, which are not covered by the Copyright Act but rather are the subject to various state statutory and common law protections. Relying heavily on a 2011 report concerning the legal state of Pre 72 recordings from the Copyright Office, the federal district court for the Souther District of New York granted the labels’ motion for summary judgment.1 Vimeo appealed.
In discussing the origins of Sec. 512, the Second Circuit describes the “compromise” that Congress sought to establish between content creators and content users. That compromise provided creators with a ‘notice and takedown’ provision, which allowed creators to avoid filing individual copyright infringement actions against each and every unauthorized use online. That compromise provided users immunity from infringement claims and monitoring responsibilities, provided the user expeditiously remove content in response to a takedown request. This compromise, the Second Circuit concludes, would be illusory if Pre 72 recordings weren’t subject to the 512 safe harbor.
The Second Circuit begins by noting that “the district court accepted without discussion the position taken by the United States Copyright Office in a report prepared in 2011 that the safe harbor does not protect against liability for infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings.” The Second Circuit then dissects the report and its shortcomings.
The Second Circuit points out that
The Report begins its analysis by asserting that § 512(c)’s term “infringement of copyright” is defined in § 501(a) as the violation of “any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122.” Section 501(a), however, does not contain such a definition. The Copyright Act’s definitions are set forth in § 101, and do not include a definition for “infringement of copyright.
The Second Circuit rejects the Office’s conclusion, reasoning
The statement that one who violates rights identified in specified sections is an “infringer of copyright” does not purport to set forth an exclusive definition of “infringer of copyright.” … To state that conduct x violates a law is not the same thing as saying that conduct x is the only conduct that violates the law. (emphasis in original)
The Second Circuit concludes, therefore, that the safe harbor must include Pre 72 recordings or the entire “compromise” envisaged by Congress would be illusory.
what Congress intended in passing § 512(c) was to strike a compromise under which, in return for the obligation to take down infringing works promptly on receipt of notice of infringement from the owner, Internet service providers would be relieved of liability for user-posted infringements of which they were unaware, as well as of the obligation to scour matter posted on their services to ensure against copyright infringement. The purpose of the compromise was to make economically feasible the provision of valuable Internet services while expanding protections of the interests of copyright owners through the new notice-and-takedown provision. To construe § 512(c) as leaving service providers subject to liability under state copyright laws for postings by users of infringements of which the service providers were unaware would defeat the very purpose Congress sought to achieve in passing the statute.
Second Circuit Decision
Copyright Office Pre-72 Report
ESPN recently initiated a rate proceeding with performing rights organization BMI. ESPN claimed that the rate BMI was seeking was above market and asked the federal district court for the Southern District of New York, which has continuing jurisdiction over the consent decree between BMI and the Department of Justice to determine “reasonable” rates. BMI has responded (attached below) and claims it is simply asking ESPN to continue paying the same percentage of revenue rate to which it agreed 10 years ago.
BMI claims that ESPN utilizes a BMI blanket license to cover so-called “incidental and ambient” music performances, such as in broadcasts of live sporting events; e.g., at Heinz Field the Pittsburgh Steelers sometimes play Styx’ “Renegade” during commercial breaks when the Steelers are on defense to “hype” the crowd. If the Steelers are on Monday Night Football and ESPN breaks back to the game before “Renegade” has stopped playing, for the purpose of music copyright licensing ESPN has “performed” that song, for which it must have a license. This is true even though Heinz Field already has its own license to perform that song to the fans sitting in the stadium to watch the game. In a bit of litigation hyperbole BMI argues that “ambient stadium music is a critical component of the broadcast that allows ESPN to attract viewers by making them feel like they are sitting in the stadium cheering on their favorite team.” How can something that is “ambient” (e.g., “as ignorable as it is interesting”) also be a “critical component” of a broadcast?
So how much does BMI want ESPN to pay for this ambient but “critical component”? $15 million per year. That figure is the product of ESPN’s annual revenue ($11b in 2014) multiplied by 0.1375%, the lowest rate among the rates charged for cable television broadcasts (“music intensive” programming networks pay 0.9% of gross revenue, “general entertainment” programming networks pay 0.375% of gross revenue, and “news and sports” programming networks pay 0.1375% of gross revenue.).
However, in 2005, the last year of ESPN’s prior license with BMI, ESPN’s annual revenue was “just” $5b. 1 This is one of the problems with a percentage of revenue royalty rate: while it may be that ESPN viewed its “incidental and ambient” music performances on live broadcasts of sports to be “worth” $6.875mm annually, it does not mean that those same performances are “worth” more than twice that amount. This is especially true at a time when ESPN’s revenues are declining rapidly and content acquisitions costs are increasing. 2
BMI’s answer is below:
The Copyright Office (“CRO”) recently released what it called a response to a letter of inquiry by Rep. Doug Collins entitled “Views of the United States Copyright Office Concerning PRO Licensing of Jointly Owned Works (the “Views”),” which is provided below. For myriad reasons, this “response” appears to be totally contrived. For example, Rep. Collins sent his letter of inquiry on Tuesday, January 12, 2016. The CRO responded on Friday, January 29th – a mere 13 working days later. During these 13 days, the CRO was apparently able to (i) reach out to a sizeable number of PROs and music publishers, review potentially dozens of (confidential?) agreements between publishers and songwriters 1, and (iii) write 29 single-spaced pages of text supported by 153 footnotes! Within 4 business days of receiving this response for the CRO, Rep. Collins apparently had the idea that the Department of Justice might benefit from the CRO’s thoughts–given that the DOJ has been reviewing the consent decrees under which ASCAP and BMI operate, including the issue of whether these decrees require ASCAP and BMI to grant “100%” licenses to songs, even when the ASCAP or BMI-member songwriters are co-writers that control less than 100% of the underlying copyright in the musical work (so-called “fractional” licensing; songs for which the underlying copyright is “split” among two or more co-writers are sometimes referred to as “split works.”). The DOJ provides details of its investigation of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees here: https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-consent-decree-review-ascap-and-bmi-2015.
As is obvious from the sarcasm-laden prose above, I am highly skeptical that the above “facts” occurred as they appear. If you think my suspicions are misplaced, consider that just two weeks before the Views were released, the CRO released a report on the so-called “making available” right. That report was written in response to a letter of inquiry that was sent to the CRO by then Representative Mel Watt on December 13, 2013; i.e., while the CRO was able to draft a response to Rep. Collins in 13 working days, it labored for 801 calendar days to respond to Rep. Watt!
Even assuming the CRO miraculously crafted the attached in 13 days, it still suffers from fundamental flaws that make it completely unhelpful to the discussion of whether the blanket licenses that ASCAP and BMI offer — under requirements of their respective consent decrees — do and should provide 100% licenses to split works.
For example, the CRO begins by stating that “the fractional licensing of jointly owned musical works—a longstanding practice of the music industry—went unquestioned as a background fact by the many stakeholders who participated, including both licensors and licensees.” (Views p. 2). There are at least two significant problems with this statement. First, several of the citations in support of this “fact” appear to be taken wildly out of context.
Likewise, Spotify does state that “Although the Copyright Laws provide that a nonexclusive licensee of a co-author of a joint work may not be sued for copyright infringement, custom and practice in the music industry has developed such that each co-author of a musical work only licenses its proportionate share in the underlying work.” (Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office’s March 17, 2014 Notice of Inquiry at 4 (May 23, 2014), available at http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/comments/Docket2014_3/Spotify_USA_Inc_MLS_2014.pdf). Spotify’s quote, however, is in the context of its explanation of why fractional licensing is bad and why Sec. 115 of the Copyright Act should be amended to create a blanket license under which 100% licenses would be granted! (“This means that in order to avoid liability for copyright infringement – and the crushing statutory damages available under the Copyright Laws – Spotify must obtain licenses from each co-author owning a share in an individual work, no matter how small that co-author’s interest might be. … Spotify believes that the effectiveness of the Section 115 license can be ensured if uses of musical works were covered pursuant to a blanket license, in a manner similar to the Section 114 license.”) (pp. 4-6).
This leads to the second significant problem: the evidence regarding fractional licensing is in connection with individual music publishers licensing the reproduction (or synchronization) rights in their individual repertory to interactive services, not the blanket performance licenses issued by ASCAP and BMI, under which these same music publishers, who in a competitive market would be competing against each other on price to license services, jointly set a single price, which–absent the consent decrees–would be a violation of antitrust laws! Based on a series of statements regarding the licensing practices of individual publishers, each licensing only its particular catalog, the CRO, in a cagey (and totally disingenuous) slight-of-hand, then states “Despite the wide-ranging nature of the study and invitation to raise additional issues, none of the participants identified fractional licensing of musical works by the PROs as a practice that needed to be changed.” Do you see what the CRO does there? It notes that industry participants acknowledge that publishers, when licensing their individual catalogs — typically in connection with licensing reproduction or synchronization rights — license on a fractional basis, and from that concludes that the licenses granted by ASCAP and BMI, which are blanket licenses that aggregate the catalogs of thousands of individual publishers who would otherwise be competing against one another on price, must likewise be only granting fractional licenses.
Perhaps the most egregious example of the lengths to which the CRO goes to reach its desired conclusion — rather than the one dictated by the actual Copyright Act — is the following statement and supporting citations: “Because the industry practice of fractional licensing of performance rights … has been amply documented in the submissions of commenting parties in the DOJ’s pending review process, the below analysis assumes that fact and focuses primarily on the legal consequences that follow.” (Views p. 3). Do you care to guess which submissions the CRO cites in support of this “ample documentation”? If you guessed ASCAP, BMI and SESAC, you are correct. 2
Apparently the CRO failed to read the following submissions:
The CRO at least accurately states the basic principle of copyright co-ownership: “Co-owners of a joint work “[are] treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an independent right to use [or] license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.” Each co-owner may thus grant a nonexclusive license to use the entire work without the consent of other co-owners, provided that the licensor accounts for and pays over to his or her co-owners their pro-rata shares of the proceeds.” (Views p. 6) (internal citations omitted). Citing the copyright treatise Goldstein on Copyright, the CRO notes “the default rules within the Act are only a “starting point,” with “collaborators . . . free to alter this statutory allocation of rights and liabilities by contract.” Id. (emphasis added) It is striking that the following 23 pages deal with these contractual arrangements among copyright owners to alter the basic principle of copyright law; i.e., the ways in which a (supposedly) independent economic actor (a co-writer) uses private contractual provisions to restrict the exercise of the full panoply of rights enjoyed by another independent economic actor (her other co-writers).
This focus on what co-writers are permitted to do under the Copyright Act allows the CRO to completely ignore whether such actions might run afoul of antitrust laws. For example, the CRO states “As permitted under the 1976 Act, these contracts represent an agreement by the cowriters to divide and apportion as between themselves what would otherwise be the default equal and undivided interests in the copyright.” (Views p. 9) (emphasis added) Likewise, the CRO describes a contractual provision limiting co-owners’ ability to license 100% of a co-authored work as “as clearly permitted under the Act ….” (Views p. 10)
The biased nature of the CRO’s inquiry is further evidenced in its discussion of the intersection of the Copyright Act and the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees. The CRO states that, “Although [the definition of “repertoire” in the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees] neither specifically embraces nor rejects the concept of partial interests, because the consent decrees were amended after 1978, the definition of repertoire in each should be construed consistently with the 1976 Copyright Act, which allows for divided ownership of exclusive rights, including the right of public performance.” (Views p. 13). It is also true, however, that 1976 Act is also the source of the bedrock copyright principle that co-owners are tenants-in-common, each controlling an undivided partial interest in the entire copyrighted work. Presumably, the consent decrees need to be “construed consistently” with that principle as well.
Further, the CRO claims that, “given the definition of “repertoire” in the decrees (“those works the right of public performance [the PRO] has . . . the right to license”), to reject such an understanding [that the repertoire only includes the fractional interest of a member-songwriter] would mean that the ASCAP and BMI repertoires must exclude any work for which the PRO could offer only a partial license, since there would be no “right” to license the entire work.” (Views p. 14). Such a conclusion, however, is completely at odds with the standard membership / affiliation agreements into a songwriter enters with ASCAP / BMI, respectively. For example, ASCAP’s form writer agreement grants to ASCAP “the right to license non-dramatic public performances” of “each musical work” that the owner “wrote, composed, published, acquired or owned” “alone, or jointly, or in collaboration with others” and in which “the owner now has any right, title, interest or control whatsoever, in whole or in part.” BMI’s form writer agreement – while less detailed – likewise grants to BMI the right to license non-dramatic public performances of “all musical compositions … composed by you alone or with one or more co-writers.” (see Comments of Media Licensees’ at p. 7). In other words, in order to conclude that the definition of “repertoire” in the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees must mean only that fraction of a work controlled by a member-songwriter, the CRO had to completely ignore the actual agreements into which the PROs enter with songwriters that specifically grant to each PRO the right to license all of a co-written work.
One might wonder whether the CRO didn’t know about the existence of these ASCAP and BMI songwriter agreements. That might be a possibility except for the fact that on the very next page the CRO cites to the very ASCAP and BMI writer agreements I cite in the previous paragraph!
In fact, the prevarication gets even more blatant. The CRO states, “The practice of divided ownership and fractional licensing is also consistent with the ASCAP and BMI membership agreements and related documents. For example, the grant of rights by a writer or publisher to BMI extends only to rights “own[ed]” or “acquire[d]” by the member to perform “any part or all of the [member’s] Works.” The BMI writer agreement further provides that, upon termination of the agreement, if BMI “continue[s] to license your interest in any Work,” it will continue to make payments. While the ASCAP membership agreements are less clear on these points, ASCAP’s title registration system is indicative of fractional administration of works.” (p. 16)
The entire paragraph 4(a) of the BMI agreement reads, “Except as otherwise provided herein, you hereby grant to us for the Period: (a) All the rights that you own or acquire publicly to perform, and to license others to perform, anywhere in the world, in any and all places and in any and all media, now known or which hereafter may be developed, any part or all of the Works.” Thus, the grant specifically provides BMI with the right to license all of the “Work” that was written or co-written by the songwriter. You will also note that “Works” is a defined term, the definition of which is, “[(1)(b)](i) All musical compositions (including the musical segments and individual compositions written for a dramatic or dramatico-musical work) composed by you alone or with one or more co-writers during the Period.” Read together, it is clear that a BMI songwriter is granting to BMI the right to license all of a Work, even if that Work was written by more than that BMI songwriter.
The ASCAP songwriter agreement, far from being “less clear” on these points is, in fact, a model of clarity, making the CRO’s claims to the contrary that much more egregious. Section 1 of ASCAP’s Membership Agreement reads as follows:
“The [songwriter] grants to the [ASCAP] for the term hereof, the right to license non-dramatic public performances (as hereinafter defined), of each musical work:
Of which the[songwriter] is a copyright proprietor; or
Which the[songwriter], alone, or jointly, or in collaboration with others, wrote, composed, published, acquired or owned; or
In which the[songwriter] now has any right, title, interest or control whatsoever, in whole or in part; or
Which hereafter, during the term hereof, may be written, composed, acquired, owned, published or copyrighted by the[songwriter], alone, jointly or in collaboration with others; or
In which the[songwriter] may hereafter, during the term hereof, have any right, title, interest or control, whatsoever, in whole or in part.
The right to license the public performance of every such musical work shall be deemed granted to the [ASCAP] by this instrument for the term hereof, immediately upon the work being written, composed, acquired, owned, published or copyrighted.
The CRO’s decision to simply ignore all of this language, including the eight seperate instances in which joint authorship and/or partial ownership are specifically included in the works the member is dedicating to the ASCAP repertoire is, frankly, shocking.
The rest of the CRO letter is a recitation of the parade of horribles that will befall songwriters, publishers and PROs if the consent decrees are interpreted in a way that requires 100% licensing. Markedly absent from this parade are the reasons why licensees should bear the burden of costs associated with fixing these (potential) problems. For example, the CRO notes that,
[I]t appears that neither ASCAP nor BMI has in place a mechanism that would allow the PRO to track and account for payments to non-members on a broad basis, and that there would be significant obstacles to achieving this. In many cases, the PRO may not have current or reliable information concerning the current co-owners of a particular song, including how to contact them—let alone heirs or assignees. As the Office explained in its recent report, the music licensing marketplace is characterized by a lack of uniform data concerning song ownership and licensing. The ASCAP and BMI royalty payment systems presumably would need to be significantly enlarged (and largely crossduplicated) to generate payments for a multitude of non-members. Equally if not more overwhelming would be a scenario whereby individual authors and publishers receiving 100- percent payments from ASCAP and BMI would need to track down and pay royalties to coowners themselves. (Views p. 21)
To which a licensee might reasonably respond, “so?” The publishers and PROs chose to allow this system of individual fractional ownership coupled with 100% collective blanket licensing to evolve over the last 50 years. The same parties cannot now be heard to complain that they don’t like the system they’ve created and want someone else to pay to clean it up. The licensee community is certainly is a far less advantageous position to know how to contact all of the current owners of a particular song or make payments thereto.
More fundamentally, this entire exercise is being driven by the publishers’ desire to partially withdraw their performance rights from ASCAP and BMI to “hold up” digital music services for higher fees. This PRO system was able to evolve over the past 50 years precisely because the publishers viewed collective licensing as better than individual licensing. But collective licensing — which is otherwise a violation of antitrust law — comes at a cost. Now that the bill has come due, it appears that the songwriters, publishers and PROs want someone else to pay it.
“a provision reviewed by the Office addressed the interests of three songwriters, one affiliated with ASCAP, who received a 50 percent share of the copyright, and two affiliated with BMI, who each received a 25 percent share.” pp. 9-10.
“one contractual provision reviewed by the Office awarded one of three co-writers a one-third share of the copyright, but prohibited that co-writer from granting even a partial (i.e., fractional) license in the work.” (p. 10).
“one representative provision in a copublishing agreement reviewed by the Office stated specifically that where the songwriter “writes, owns, and/or controls less than one hundred percent (100%)” of a musical composition, the songwriter was granting the publisher rights only to the writer’s “fractional share” of the work. In another agreement, the songwriter granted rights to existing and future compositions only “to the extent written, composed, created, owned, controlled and/or acquired” by the songwriter.” (p. 11)
one coadministration clause applicable to two songwriters reviewed by the Office provided that the parties would enter into agreements “solely with respect” to their respective interests and that all proceeds were to be paid “directly to (Party A) and (Party B) in the shares set forth (in the agreement).” (p. 12) ↩
As I’ve often said, reviewing litigation dockets is a great place to learn new things. Instead of focusing on a judge’s final decision, one can often learn more by reading the party’s pleadings, which provide the strongest advocacy for a particular legal position. [caveat–it is critical to read BOTH side’s pleadings]. It is also often the case that a recording artist or songwriter’s contract will be appended to the complaint, providing useful insight not only into the issues in a particular litigation, but towards how the music industry evolves over time. I was reading Rita Ora’s recording contract with Roc Nation–a copy of which can be found here–and I remembered some research I’d done a while ago but never bothered to post here. Specifically, a review of 3 recording contracts executed between 1983 and 1992 demonstrate how public performance for sound recording royalties made their way into major label recording contracts. [caveat–this is not intended to be scientific; it is merely an interesting fact based on the 3 contracts in question]
So, check this out. In 1983, CBS did *not* have any language about public performance rights in sound recordings—check out the Toto contract below. By 1989, the language does exist—see 10.04 of the Allman Bros. agreement with CBS reproduced below. Identical language appears in the Interscope license with Dr. Dre is 1992—see 10.05 of the Dre agreement reproduced below—even though I’m not aware of any relationship between CBS (which was bought by Sony) and Interscope (which was bought by UMG)!
The Toto recording contract is below.
The Allman Bros. recording contract is below.
Dr. Dre’s recording agreement is below:
I recently came across two interesting articles that discuss whether the Copyright Act preempts state or common law performance rights in sound recordings fixed prior to 1972.
Ostensibly, Prof. Pulsinelli’s article is focused on the Legacy Sound Recording Protection Act (the “LSRPA”), which was introduced in the last session of the Tennessee state legislature. The LSRPA would grant owners of Pre 72 Recordings essentially the same rights in Tennessee that owners of sound recordings made after 1972 enjoy under the federal Copyright Act.
Prof. Ross’ article takes as its jumping off point two recent federal district court decisions, one in California and another in New York, which found an exclusive right in Pre 72 Recordings. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. CV 13-5693, 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5784, 2014 WL 7172270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).
Both articles focus analysis on whether state laws, whether statutory or common, that attempt to create a performance right in Pre 72 Recordings are preempted by the Copyright Act. Both articles begin by noting that sound recordings did not enjoy any federal copyright protection until the enactment of the Sound Recording Act of 1971, which established a reproduction and distribution right—but not a performance right—for sound recording initially fixed after February 15, 1972. When Congress completed its major rewrite of the Copyright Act in 1976, it included a very broad preemption clause embodied in § 301(a), which effectively preempts all state laws purporting to grant any right “equivalent to” any right provided in § 106. Not wanting to displace the reproduction and distribution rights in Pre 72 Recordings that many states historically provided to discourage record piracy, a.k.a. “bootlegging”, § 301(c) then goes on to exempt Pre 72 Recordings from the general preemption of § 301(a).
The ‘general’ preemption language in § 301(a) provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
The ‘exception’ to the general preemption language in § 301(c) provides:
With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced on and after February 15, 2067. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title before, on, or after February 15, 2067.
In order to determine whether performance rights for Pre 72 Recordings are preempted by the Copyright Act, the authors describe preemption and its primary forms. Preemption exists because of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Article IV, Clause 2). There are two broad categories of preemption: express preemption and implied preemption. Express preemption occurs when the applicable statutory scheme contains a provision that expressly states that the federal statute is meant to preempt state law in a particular area. If the federal law does not contain an express preemption provision, the state law may nevertheless violate the Supremacy Clause under the theory of implied preemption if the federal statutory scheme is so detailed and pervasive that it “occupies the field,” leaving no room for state law to operate (so-called “field preemption”) or the state statute “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (so-called “conflict preemption”). The fact that a statute contains an express preemption does not mean that the statute cannot still be found invalid as impliedly preempted.
The most important Supreme Court guidance on preemption in the context of conflict between state and federal law is Goldstein v. California (412 U.S. 546 (1973)). In Goldstein, the Court considered the validity of a California law criminalizing record piracy; i.e., the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of sound recordings. The timing of the case is quite complicated: it involves sound recording fixed prior to February 15, 1972, arrived at the Supreme Court after the passage of the SRA in 1971, but before the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act that added the express preemption provisions. In Goldstein, the Supreme Court upheld the California law as a valid exercise of the state’s power, finding that the Copyright Act left sound recordings “unattended,” and thus states could choose to protect them.
Prof. Pulsinelli quotes the Goldstein Court for the proposition that the Copyright Act itself is a reflection of Congress’ interest in setting broad, national policy around protecting copyrighted works, stating “[t]he objective of the Copyright Clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of rights national in scope.” Prof. Pulsinelli also quotes the House Report accompanying the 1976 Act, “One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution … was to promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author’s rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods for dissemination of an author’s work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional intent.” Performance rights in particular implicate the problems of varying state regulation, as noted by a variety of courts and commentators.
Prof. Pulsinelli argues that “At least theoretically, the Copyright Act is sufficiently comprehensive as to “occupy the field” and leave no room for the states to operate.238 However, given the strong express preemption provided in § 301(a), such an analysis is generally unnecessary—any law that escapes express preemption because it falls outside the scope of § 301(a) is likely also to fall outside the “field” occupied by the statutory scheme.” Instead, he argues that state law protections of performance rights in sound recordings is likely preempted under the “conflict preemption” doctrine.
Judge McMahon has indicated she is considering reconsidering her prior ruling in which she found a performance right in sound recordings fixed before 1972. Her order is below.
The antitrust case brought by the Television Music License Committee against SESAC detailed here previously has been settled. SESAC agreed to pay the TMLC members $43mm as damages (i.e., excessive royalty fees) and $16mm in legal fees. The papers are below.
A magistrate judge has recommended that the lawsuit brought by VerStandig Broadcasting should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; i.e., for lack of Article III standing. In finding that the plaintiffs’ declaratory action failed to raise a justiciable controversy, the judge found that the issue of copyright liability is not “traceable” to SoundExchange because SoundExchange does not own or enforce copyrights Verstandig might infringe. As the judge stated: “Any dispute that may arise in that scenario is between the copyright owner and the broadcaster. Thus, the copyright owners themselves, who are ‘not party to this litigation, must act’ (or not act, as the case may be) in order for this particular injury to be cured.”
The wife of the writer of The Monkees’ hit “Daydream Believer” is suing EMI over foreign royalties, arguing that EMI’s wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries cannot deduct a portion of royalties prior to distributing the royalties to EMI U.S.