UMG’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Global Eagle’s Response
Judge Wu’s Tentative Order
Judge Wu’s Supplemental Order
UMG’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Global Eagle’s Response
Judge Wu’s Tentative Order
Judge Wu’s Supplemental Order
The Second Circuit delivered its highly anticipated decision in the Capitol Records v. Vimeo case. Various record labels sued UGC site Vimeo for copyright infringement of sound recording fixed prior to February 14, 1972, so-called Pre-72 recordings. The labels argued that the safe harbor provisions of Sec. 512 of the Copyright Act, which provides immunity to copyright infringement liability to UGC host sites subject to certain conditions, do not apply to Pre 72 recordings, which are not covered by the Copyright Act but rather are the subject to various state statutory and common law protections. Relying heavily on a 2011 report concerning the legal state of Pre 72 recordings from the Copyright Office, the federal district court for the Souther District of New York granted the labels’ motion for summary judgment.1 Vimeo appealed.
In discussing the origins of Sec. 512, the Second Circuit describes the “compromise” that Congress sought to establish between content creators and content users. That compromise provided creators with a ‘notice and takedown’ provision, which allowed creators to avoid filing individual copyright infringement actions against each and every unauthorized use online. That compromise provided users immunity from infringement claims and monitoring responsibilities, provided the user expeditiously remove content in response to a takedown request. This compromise, the Second Circuit concludes, would be illusory if Pre 72 recordings weren’t subject to the 512 safe harbor.
The Second Circuit begins by noting that “the district court accepted without discussion the position taken by the United States Copyright Office in a report prepared in 2011 that the safe harbor does not protect against liability for infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings.” The Second Circuit then dissects the report and its shortcomings.
The Second Circuit points out that
The Report begins its analysis by asserting that § 512(c)’s term “infringement of copyright” is defined in § 501(a) as the violation of “any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122.” Section 501(a), however, does not contain such a definition. The Copyright Act’s definitions are set forth in § 101, and do not include a definition for “infringement of copyright.
The Second Circuit rejects the Office’s conclusion, reasoning
The statement that one who violates rights identified in specified sections is an “infringer of copyright” does not purport to set forth an exclusive definition of “infringer of copyright.” … To state that conduct x violates a law is not the same thing as saying that conduct x is the only conduct that violates the law. (emphasis in original)
The Second Circuit concludes, therefore, that the safe harbor must include Pre 72 recordings or the entire “compromise” envisaged by Congress would be illusory.
what Congress intended in passing § 512(c) was to strike a compromise under which, in return for the obligation to take down infringing works promptly on receipt of notice of infringement from the owner, Internet service providers would be relieved of liability for user-posted infringements of which they were unaware, as well as of the obligation to scour matter posted on their services to ensure against copyright infringement. The purpose of the compromise was to make economically feasible the provision of valuable Internet services while expanding protections of the interests of copyright owners through the new notice-and-takedown provision. To construe § 512(c) as leaving service providers subject to liability under state copyright laws for postings by users of infringements of which the service providers were unaware would defeat the very purpose Congress sought to achieve in passing the statute.
Second Circuit Decision
Copyright Office Pre-72 Report
TufAmerica has discovered that it can be very expensive to bring a copyright infringement claim when you don’t own the copyright allegedly being infringed. In this case, TufAmerica sued the Beastie Boys (including their record label [UMG] and music publisher [UMPG]) over the alleged sampling of TufAmerica’s recording artist Trouble Funk’s 1982 release “Say What” on the Beastie Boy’s track “Shadrach” from their 1989 release Paul’s Boutique. Judge Nathan of the SDNY recently granted Defendant’s motions for attorneys’ fees and costs totaling nearly $850,000! Judge Nathan had earlier granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that TufAmerica lacked standing to sue for infringement because it did not own an exclusive license to the Trouble Funk recording / musical composition at issue. Instead, Judge Nathan found that, at most, TufAmerica had acquired a “bare right to sue,” which is not an exclusive license and does not provide standing under the Copyright Act’s Sec. 501’s standing requirements.
Judge Nathan’s decision is below.
Jay Z’s Tidal is the latest interactive service to be sued for copyright infringement for failure to secure reproduction rights to musical compositions embodied in sound recordings made available to listeners / subscribers of the service. The suit specifically alleges that Tidal failed to submit the required notices of intent that are prerequisites to taking advantage of the statutory license under Sec. 115 of the Copyright Act.
The complaint is here:
Randy California (born Randall Wolfe) was a singer songwriter and original member of the 60s psychedelic rock band Spirit, best known for “I Got a Line on You,” from the band’s second album.
A portion of the intro to the song “Taurus,” an obscure track on Spirit’s eponymous 1968 recording, bears a resemblance to introduction of “Stairway to Heaven,” the 1971 release by Led Zeppelin that is counted among Rolling Stone magazine’s 500 greatest songs of all time.
You can listen to “Taurus” and decide for yourself.
What is more interesting to me than whether Jimmy Page lifted the intro of one of the most famous songs in rock history from one of its most obscure is an argument in Led Zeppelin’s motion to dismiss, which alleges that Randy California isn’t the “author” of the song and, therefore, lacks standing to sue. The argument–which appears quite strong–is based on Randy’s first songwriting agreement, executed in 1968 when he was only 16. That agreement, which is provided below, defines the relationship between Hollenbeck Music (the publishing company affiliated with Ole Records, to which Spirit was signed for an exclusive recording contract) thusly: “Publisher … employs Writer to render his services as a songwriter and composer …” This language appears to be classic “work made for hire” under which the Copyright Act treats the employer as the author of the copyrighted work. (See Sec. 101, defining a “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.”). Said differently, in this context the “work made for hire” doctrine treats the copyright in the song “Taurus” as if Hollenbeck had actually written the notes in question. Under the Copyright Act’s Sec. 501(b), only the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright has standing to sue for its infringement. Importantly, however, “[a] creator of a work made for hire does not qualify as a beneficial owner even if he or she is entitled to royalties.” Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109, 1116 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2015). This appears to be fatal to Randy’s heirs attempt to sue Led Zeppelin for infringement!
ASIDE: If Jimmy Page did copy the intro to Stairway to Heaven, then Hollenbeck may have a claim for infringement, so succeeding on this motion to dismiss is not necessarily a lasting victory for Led Zeppelin.
The exclusive songwriter agreement is here.
The motion to dismiss is here.
District Judge Gail Standish (C.D. Cal.) has issued a whimsical opinion dismissing without prejudice a songwriter’s claim that Taylor Swift’s “Shake It Off” copied lyrics from his song “Haters Gone Hate.” In her conclusion, Judge Standish quotes several of Swift’s songs:
At present, the Court is not saying that Braham can never, ever, ever get his case back in court. But, for now, we have got problems, and the Court is not sure Braham can solve them. As currently drafted, the Complaint has a blank space— one that requires Braham to do more than write his name. And, upon consideration of the Court’s explanation in Part II, Braham may discover that mere pleading BandAids will not fix the bullet holes in his case. At least for the moment, Defendants have shaken off this lawsuit.
While a nice humorous twist on the often staid language of a federal district court opinion, I did not find this language the most interesting — from a copyright infringement standpoint. Instead, I was drawn to the discussion of what constitutes protectable expression; i.e., sufficiently original. After a brief discussion of internet searches for lyrics containing “haters gonna hate” and/or “players gonna play,” Judge Standish notes, somewhat ominously, that “Braham should consider whether filing a new complaint claiming that his lyrics “Players Gonna Play” and “Haters Gonna Hate” are original would conflict with his duty under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 not to make factually or legally baseless claims.”
Judge Standish’s opinion is below.
Jay Z won a motion to dismiss a copyright infringement case alleging that his alleged sampling and use of the word “oh” in an audio recording and music video entitled Run This Town. Jay Z allegedly sampled the recorded “oh” from the recording Hook &Sling Part I Eddie Bo and the Soul Finders. The “oh” in question appears once in Hook & Sling but allegedly appears 42 times in Run This Town. In a direct refutation of the Bridgeport Music case from the 6th Circuit, the SDNY court relied on 2nd Circuit precedent that distinguishes between “factual copying” and “actionable copying.” The former “requires only the fact that the infringing work copies something from the copyrighted work; the latter . . . requires that the copying is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion that infringement . . . has occurred.” Judge Kaplan concluded that “In arguing that the Court should find qualitative significance simply because defendants have actually copied its work, plaintiff improperly conflates factual copying and actionable copying.”
“A music rights group has become the first organization to successfully force a copyright-focused website blockade in freedom-friendly Iceland. Following a District Court ruling, ISPs including Vodafone must now block The Pirate Bay and Deildu, Iceland’s largest private torrent site.” Full story here.
A magistrate judge has recommended that the lawsuit brought by VerStandig Broadcasting should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds; i.e., for lack of Article III standing. In finding that the plaintiffs’ declaratory action failed to raise a justiciable controversy, the judge found that the issue of copyright liability is not “traceable” to SoundExchange because SoundExchange does not own or enforce copyrights Verstandig might infringe. As the judge stated: “Any dispute that may arise in that scenario is between the copyright owner and the broadcaster. Thus, the copyright owners themselves, who are ‘not party to this litigation, must act’ (or not act, as the case may be) in order for this particular injury to be cured.”